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Former Judge Kettering of the Denver County Court once re-
marked that the most common weakness in will-drafting was the
inability of the will draftsman to use the English language clearly
and precisely. No will of any complexity should be signed until
at least two attorneys have checked it-every one of us occasionally
has an intellectual or linguistic blind spot. Finally, the attorney's
job is not complete unless he periodically checks the wills he has
drawn in the light of any changed conditions and reviews the
situation with his client whenever a new will may be advisable.
TRANSFERS TAKING EFFECT AT OR
UPON DEATH
T. RABER TAYLOR
of the Denver Bar
When we talk about transfers taking effect at or upon death
we are generally talking about rich man's law. Generally we are
lalking about the Law of Trusts and the Law of Future Interests
and their impeding effect on the imposition of death taxes and
income taxes. A short translation of the terms "transfers taking
effect at or upon death" is a string between the donor and the
donee. Unfortunately, it is this string upon which has been played
the sad note of tax victories for the Government.
Any study of transfers taking effect at or upon death is also
a study of the law of the Philadelphia property lawyer. The first
inheritance tax law in the United States was passed in Pennsyl-
vania in 1862. This law anticipated the desire of Philadelphia
property lawyers to avoid the imposition of the inheritance tax
which applied to property passing at death. Accordingly, the
law imposes the inheritance tax on transfers intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or upon death. The techniques de-
veloped by the Philadelphia property lawyers were brought into
the Federal tax area with the passage of the Federal Estate Tax
Law in 1916. From the passage of the federal law on, September
8, 1916 and down to 1935, well drafted property law trusts in-
volving future interests, were successful in insulating large estates
from the federal estate tax. Some of the celebrated taxpayer vic-
tories well known to us are: Shukert v. Allen,' Reinecke v. North-
ern Trust Company,2 May v. Heiner,3 and Helvering v. St. Louis
Union Trust Company.4 Each of these decisions, with the excep-
tion possibly of Shukert v. Allen, has been expressly overruled
either by the United States Supreme Court or by Congress. The
tide began to run against the taxpayers in 1940. You all recall
the celebrated case of Helvering v. Hallock 5 which reversed Helver-
ing v. St. Louis Union Trust Company and held that whenever
'273 U. S. 545 (1927).
2 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
3 281 U. S. 238 (1930).
4 296 U. S. 39 (1935).
'309 U. S. 106 (1940).
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there was in the decedent a possibility of reverter that the entire
estate should be subject to federal estate tax. You also recall Com-
missioner v. Church's Estate 6 in 1949 which expressly overruled
May v. Heiner. The Technical Changes Act of October 7, 1949
has repudiated Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company.
Not only clients, but also lawyers, tend to believe that prop-
erty transferred in trust with just a little string attached should
do no harm. Small lines have destroyed great ships and sent them
onto the rocks and shoals. Let us hope that none of the instru-
ments with which you and I are identified will ever put our client's
"treasure trove" into the sovereign's treasury.
To you it is obvious that "transfers intended" are found most
frequently in the pattern where the husband-father-grantor has
created trusts or made other transfers for the present or future
benefit of his wife and children. In most of the cases, the trusts
have been irrevocable trusts. However, life insurance and annuity
contracts have also run afoul of the taxing words.
Transfers intended to take effect in possession will cause heavy
imposition of death taxes because recently many advisers, lawyers
as well as life underwriters, have been near-sighted. They focused
attention on the Federal Income Tax Law. You all recall that in
1943 the Federal Income Tax Law amended Section 167 (c) for
two purposes: (1) to counteract Helvering v. Stewart;7 and (2)
in order to give income tax relief to some parent-grantors who
had created irrevocable intervivos trusts for minor dependents.
Some advisers and some lay men have been by this federal
income tax section lulled into a false sense of security. Under this
section, the federal income tax consequences are fairly clear as it
applies to one widely used type of trust clause. The section con-
tains provisions for accumulation of income during the minority
of the beneficiary with a further provision that the trustee may
apply to the use of the child so much of the income as the trustee
considers proper for education, maintenance or support. In fact,
the Federal Income Tax Regulations (Reg. 111, Section 29.167-2),
and those under the Clifford Doctrine, expressly except from their
broad scope any contention for income taxation of the grantor,
contrary to Section 167 (c), Reg. 111, Sec. 29.22 (a)-21 (d).
In passing, let us point out that the Colorado Income Tax
Law 8 has not been amended to parallel Sec. 167 (c) of the fed-
eral law.
Our focus of attention is on estate taxes. Unfortunately, we
find no counterpart of Code Section 167 (c) in the estate tax chap-
ter of the code. On the contrary, we find the dragnet trap amend-
ment of the Technical Changes Act of 1949 taxing practically all
transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death.
6335 U. S. 632 (1949).
'317 U. S. 154 (1946).
8Colo. Sec. 13(c), Reg. p. 151, Art. 13 (c).
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Every trap is designed to catch certain victims. Let us block
out the arrangements that will be trapped:
(1) The decedent transferred property in trust, to pay the
income to his wife during her life, and at her death to pay the
corpus to the decedent if living, and if not, to his children. The
decedent was survived by his wife. The value of the transferred
property, less the outstanding life estate in the wife, is includible
in the decedent's gross estate since the children cannot obtain
possession or enjoyment of the property, through ownership of
their interest, except by surviving the decedent.
(2) The decedent transferred property in trust to accumulate
the income during his life and at his death to distribute the prin-
cipal and accumulated income to his son or the son's estate. While
the decedent retained no right or interest in the property, the
transfer is taxable since possession or enjoyment of the property
cannot be obtained except by surviving the decedent.
(3) The decedent transferred property in trust, to accumu-
late the income until his son reached the age of 30, or until the
decedent's prior death. Upon the first to occur of these events the
son was to receive the corpus. The decedent's death in fact oc-
curred before his son attained the age of 30. The transfer is tax-
able under Section 811 (c) (3) (B) since the son could obtain
possession or enjoyment only by surviving the earlier to occur of
the decedent's death or the son's attaining age 30, and since the
decedent's death in fact occurred first.
Now for two arrangements that are not supposed to be
trapped:
(1) The decedent transferred property in trust, providing
for an estate for life in his daughter, and a remainder to the chil-
dren of the daughter. No part of the property is includible under
this section. The daughter can possess and enjoy the property
through ownership of the life estate without surviving the de-
cedent. The same is true of the daughter's children with respect
to their remainder interest.
(2) The decedent transferred property in trust providing for
accumulation of the income during his life, and at his death to
pay the entire fund to his children or their issue. His wife was
given the unrestricted power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust.
The wife survived the decedent and did not in fact exercise her
power during the decedent's life. Under the last sentence of Section
811 (c) (3), the transfer is not taxable since possession or enjoy-
ment of the property was obtainable during the decedent's life
through the exercise of the wife's power which was a power of
appointment as defined in Section 811 (f) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code, and was in fact exercisable immediately prior to
the decedent's death.
Between these two extremes is the field for caution. Seem-
ingly unimportant trust clauses deserve careful drafting to avoid
having the trust corpus subjected to estate taxation on the basis
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of a theory not readily perceived. Often the clause may even be
unessential to the grantor's purpose of setting up a trust for his
children. Even careful and informed drafting can give no abso-
lute assurance against new Congressional demands for revenue.
TRANSFERS PRIOR TO 1949
Let us try to distill from the 1949 amendment a few guide
rules to map a course free from tax traps for our clients. First,
let us say a word about pre-October 8, 1949 transfers taking effect
at death. The Technical Changes Amendment prevents the appli-
cation of the Spiegel case ' to transfers made before October 8,
1949, the date upon which the Conference Committee agreed to
the contents of the Technical Changes Act. In addition it limits
application of Helvering v. Hallock and Klein v. U. S.10 with re-
spect to pre-October 8, 1949 transfers. The application of the
Spiegel case is prevented as to transfers made before October 8,
1949 by the removal of possibilities of reverter by operation of
law from consideration, as a ground for taxing irrevocable life-
time transfers. Therefore, if a transferor has in the past trans-
ferred property into an irrevocable trust and has provided for
payment of remainders to his children or their issue after his
death, the fact that if he should leave neither children nor grand-
children surviving him at the date of his death and that the prop-
erty would return to his estate by operation of state law, will
not alone make the transfer taxable if he is in fact survived by
either children or grandchildren.
Application of the Hallock and Klein cases is also limited as
to pre-October 8, 1949 transfers. In these cases it was provided
that the express retention of a reversionary interest will not make
a transfer taxable unless the value of the reversionary interest is
worth more than five per cent of the value of the property trans-
ferred. The value of such reversionary interest is to be determined
as of immediately before the death of the decedent.
EFFECT OF 1949 AMENDMENT
Second, let us consider the effect of the amendment on trans-
fers made after October 8, 1949. The prospective influence of the
amendment is to give full force and effect to the Klein, Hallock and
Spiegel cases and to several others as well, for all future interests,
i.e., those made after October 8, 1949. Let us spell this out. The
prospective application of the amendment keeps and affirms the
pre-existing rule that only when the death of the transferor is
the operative factor ending his reversionary interest and confer-
ring an interest in the estate on the beneficiary, does the property
transferred become includible in the estate of the transferor. In
addition, by abolishing the doctrine of Reinecke v. Northern Trust
Company, an estate tax can be levied on a parent-transferor, even
though the parent parted with all his interest, present and pros-
"Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, 335 UJ. S. 701 (1949).
"0283 U. S. 231 (1931).
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pective, in the property. You recall the old estate tax regulation
which established the test in determining whether a transfer is
taxable as one intended to take effect at death. That test was
contained in the requirement that "the decedent or his estate
possesses any right or interest in the property (whether arising
by the express terms of the instrument of transfer or otherwise)."
In other words, under the prospective amendment, it is no longer
necessary for the transferor to have even a reversionary interest.
We now look only to the persons who are to receive the possession
or enjoyment to determine whether or not the tax applies. If any
person must survive the transferor to obtain possession or enjoy-
ment, the interest passing to such person is taxable. There is one
exception to this. The law specifically provides that there is no
basis for taxing any interest of which possession or enjoyment
could be obtained by any beneficiary during the decedent's life
through the exercise of a power of appointment as defined in Sec-
tion 811 (f) (2), which, in fact was exercisable immediately prior
to the decedent's death. This has reference to transfers by the
decedent under which he grants a power of appointment to others
and makes it exercisable by them alone. This seems to overrule
the decision of the Supreme Court of Goldstone v. U. S.11
We do not have time to consider specific trust provisions as
to whether or not they will or will not be subjected to the Federal
Estate Tax. In fairness to our life underwriter friends, let us
point to a tax trap in their field. The 1949 amendment and its
effect on intervivos gifts of life insurance must await the develop-
ing decisions of the Tax Court and the District Courts. But there
are some decisions on the payment of life insurance premiums
which point to a tax trap. You recall the cases holding that the
payment of a premium on a policy by one other than the owner
constitutes in part a gift of a part interest, and therefore does
not come within the annual gift tax exclusion, except to the extent
that such payment increases the cash surrender value. 12 These
cases suggest the likelihood that the Commissioner will take the
position that a gift of a policy by an insured (even it found
not to be made in contemplation of death) may nevertheless be
held to be, at least in part, a transfer taking effect at death, since
to the extent that the proceeds exceed the cash surrender value, the
possession and enjoyment of the gift can be obtained only by the
donee surviving the decedent. Such a tax gathering construction
of the Technical Changes Act certainly should not justify inclu-
sion of more than the difference between the cash surrender value
and the face amount of the policy. We all know that the donee
has immediate possession and enjoyment of the cash surrender
value. The Commissioner might well be successful in taxing the
excess which comes into possession and enjoyment on the donor-
insured's death.
,325 U. S. 687 (1945).
,Chittenden v. Hassett, District Court of Mass., 42-1 U.S.T.C. Para. 10,047.
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